Understanding Community Resilience in Yemen: Insights from the Field (2)

19 July 2021

ARK Group and the Conflict to Peace Lab at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at The Ohio State University, recently launched the project, ‘Understanding Community Resilience in Yemen’. The focus of this research partnership is to understand how Yemenis relate to the notion of community resilience, with the ultimate aim of assisting local communities and relevant stakeholders by empowering or leveraging existing efforts to strengthen community resilience.  The first of these series of posts outlining the preliminary findings on threats, challenges and sources of communal conflict can be read here.

In this second post, we cover the main mechanisms, institutions, and local actors that have sustained or contributed to the resilience of Yemeni communities. A total of 47 respondents (men and women of different ages) were interviewed across 14 target locations in six governorates, including Sheikhs, Aqils (community liaisons), managers of local civil society organisations, doctors, business owners, and members of the armed forces/security sector, among others. These interviewees were asked about a range of issues including community resilience in terms of security provision, social cohesion, conflict and dispute resolution and quality of communal interaction with authorities and decision-makers.  

All interviewees agreed that local customs and traditions have a strong role in community resilience, especially where the presence of a central state authority is weak or absent. As Yemenis continue to grapple with mounting crises and find alternative ways to remain connected to the world, local customs and traditions have functioned as pillars of stability. For an interviewee from Hadhramaut, “It is true that the government plays its role, but I think that customs, traditions, brotherhood and dignity only exist in the citizen, and Yemenis are the ones who are upholding them. For instance, the issue of inheritance is arbitrated in a friendly manner by local leaders such as Imams, religious notables, or Sheikhs. We do not need to go to file a case at the courts.” In some target locations, informal institutions and local elites function as a substitute for the provision of public goods and services, whereas in others they operate in parallel to the local government. We hope to explore this distinction in future field research.

The notion of localised dispute resolution and self-reliance was also apparent when the interviewees were asked who members of their communities rely on when they have a problem or a conflict. The majority of respondents turned primarily to local rulers, elders, Aqils, Sheikhs or Imams in these situations, although some of the interviewees also mentioned contacting family or government officials. For instance, a respondent from Marib noted how arbitration and mediation are the preferred method of resolving agricultural land and water disputes: “what is done through the Sheikh or an arbitrator is done in an amicable and efficient way.” For many interviewees, informal institutions and local elites are not an option of last resort, but rather a more efficient and secure means of providing access to essential needs. 

However, perspectives on the benefits and drawbacks of tribalism varied across target locations and gender. While all interviewees saw local traditions and customs as playing an integral role in bringing locals together, others, such as a female interviewee from Aden noted that local traditions can sometimes bring “lawlessness into the city, such as the increase in armed tribal disputes over land resources, particularly land grabs among powerful actors.”

On the issue of security provision, most respondents mentioned the police, governmental security or the army. Yet in many target locations, insights gleaned suggest that a hybrid and more informal system is in place. Many respondents noted that, within their communities, they rely on themselves for security or that security is provided by their local leaders such as neighbourhood Aqils or Sheikhs. A respondent from Seiyun in Wadi Hadhramaut, explained, “If we start with a small nucleus, then the family is first trying to provide itself with security, but if we talk about the level of the one who provides us with security more generally, we can say that the state is trying to provide security.”

Most interviewees stated that contacting their neighbourhood representatives, Aqils, Sheikhs or elders was the most common method for citizens to interact with decision-makers and politicians. Others mentioned community meetings or making contact through social media. One respondent from Ibb City noted that communication took various forms, “through community meetings, through daily qat sessions, or at events and weddings, they communicate what they want to decision makers or through social media.” Perceptions about the quality of relations and interaction with government officials substantially varied across target locations. For instance, a respondent from Taiz felt that the relationship between ordinary citizens and the government was weak: “The interaction of decision-makers with ordinary people is very weak due to the failure of officials to return, and because of the situation that the country and society is going through.” In traditional urban centres, such as the cities of Aden, Ibb, and Taiz, the police force and other public institutions were cited more frequently than informal actors, whereas the role of Sheikhs and Aqils was more often mentioned in rural areas. In future work we hope to explore how the rural-urban divide affects the perceived role and effectiveness of local elites like Sheikhs, Aqils, and Imams.

On the role of family in community resilience, many respondents felt that family ties are an important educational resource and a support system, especially since the onset of the conflict and subsequent fragility or absence of state institutions. The importance of educating youth and dissuading them from taking up arms or joining violent extremist organisations was mentioned by multiple interviewees. As one respondent from Aden noted, the role of family is often key “by directing their children through advice and guidance and instructing them not to engage with these groups.” According to research previously conducted by ARK in Yemen, the issue of recruitment into armed groups and the role of family in the process is nevertheless more complex. Across the south, the fight against the Houthis is widely perceived as a legitimate and honourable pursuit. As such, armed conflict provides an opportunity for employment, social solidarity, and personal meaning for young man lacking outside options for employment and livelihoods. Conversely, in Houthi controlled territories, fighting the Saudi-led coalition was cited frequently in the same vein.

Another respondent from Seiyun in Wadi Hadhramaut emphasised the importance of family in supporting citizens in times of hardship: “the family’s role is considered the central axis, and it is the one that solves the problems. It is the strength and the core. Therefore, the family urges its members to work…because the family members must support each other with expenses, buying food for the home, and also in raising children… which shields society from imbalances.” Across urban and rural target locations, immediate and extended families serve as the nucleus for building resilience in the broader community.

Despite the conflict’s tragic human toll and the fragmentation of security institutions, one of the initial findings of this research is that many local communities are aware of the mechanisms that allow them to ensure their basic needs are met, security is provided, and conflicts/disputes are addressed. All respondents were able to speak of successful, mostly locally-driven initiatives that sustain the resilience of their communities. Nevertheless, the persistence of the conflict, the global impact of COVID-19 and the declining rate of external assistance raises worrying prospects about the degree to which these and other Yemeni communities will be able to remain resilient in the face of ever-growing adversity.

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Understanding Community Resilience in Yemen: Insights from the Field (1)