What will it take to close al-Hol camp?

Despite renewed urgency, particularly from the new U.S. administration, to shut down al-Hol in northeastern Syria, several key challenges persist. While many families wish to leave, a significant number of Syrians choose to remain due to insecurity, lack of services, and fear of persecution upon their return home. 

The camp, although services are deteriorating due to recent policy shifts that have reduced international assistance, still provides a reliable supply of food, water, and shelter for many residents than their communities of origin. Without viable reintegration pathways, including legal protections, economic support, and community reconciliation, voluntary departures will remain limited. 

By contrast, Iraq’s repatriation efforts offer a compelling model and a clear roadmap to success: clear political will, strong international partnerships, and robust rehabilitation programs have enabled the return of nearly 15,000 people since 2021. 

Syria could learn valuable lessons from Iraq and even decide to follow in its footsteps, but doing so will require prioritising reintegration programmes, challenging the deep-rooted stigma facing returnees, and investing in long-term solutions that support both returnees and host communities. 

Beyond Containment:

Iraq’s Blueprint for Repatriation and What It Means for Syria

Although the new U.S. administration has signalled renewed urgency in closing al-Hol camp and repatriating or reintegrating its residents, significant barriers remain. While many families do wish to leave due to deteriorating conditions, a substantial number, particularly Syrians, are hesitant to depart. Their reluctance reflects deeper structural challenges, including insecurity in areas of return, lack of basic services, and minimal reintegration support. These obstacles are likely to slow or undermine efforts to fully empty the camp, despite political momentum behind its closure.

By contrast, Iraq’s success in repatriating and reintegrating camp residents offers a pathway to success for Syria to follow. 

Al-Hol camp, situated in northeastern Syria near the Iraq border, was established to house individuals displaced following the territorial defeat of the Islamic State (IS) in 2019. As of early 2025, the camp holds approximately 40,000 residents, predominantly women and children, with Syrians and Iraqis forming the largest groups, alongside nationals from over 60 countries. While the international community, including the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and global partners, seeks to repatriate residents and close the camp to mitigate security and humanitarian crises, a significant number of residents, particularly Syrians, prefer to remain. For example, no Syrian families departed al-Hol between October 2024 and December 2024.

The lack of returns comes despite the AANES permitting camp residents to leave and return to their original areas.  

This preference stems from a lack of viable alternatives outside the camp, fears of persecution, reliance on diminishing humanitarian aid, and the social connections established between the camp residents. 

Uncertainty Upon Return 

Many Syrian families in al-Hol originate from areas still grappling with instability, destruction, or lack of governance and livelihood opportunities. Of the Syrian al-Hol residents there are approximately 2,000 from SDF- controlled areas, 11,000 from previously regime-controlled areas, and 3,000 from previously opposition-controlled areas (Aleppo and Idlib). Returning to such regions poses significant risks, including exposure to violence, lack of shelter, and absence of essential services. The camp, despite its hardships, offers a semblance of security and access to basic necessities, making the prospect of leaving daunting for these families.  

Recent reductions in humanitarian aid, notably due to policy shifts and funding cuts, have exacerbated conditions in al-Hol. However, for many residents, the camp still provides more consistent access to food, water, and medical care than is available in their places of origin. This paradoxical situation reinforces the decision of some families to remain, as the alternatives may seem worse. 

Families associated with the Islamic State face significant stigma and potential ostracization upon return to their communities. The fear of retribution, discrimination, or legal repercussions can deter residents from leaving the camp. Without comprehensive reintegration programs and community reconciliation efforts, these social barriers remain a formidable obstacle to the camp’s closure. 

The Iraqi Model  

The Iraqi government has achieved notable success in repatriating its nationals from al-Hol camp, offering a potential model for Syria. Since 2021, nearly 15,000 individuals have been repatriated, with plans to return all remaining 14,000 by 2026. This success is driven by a clear governmental commitment to repatriation, international support from the United States, European Union, and the United Nation agencies, which have provided equipment and training for registration and screening and robust rehabilitation programs at facilities like Al-Amal Center (formally Jadaa Community Rehabilitation Center) south of Mosul. 

At al-Amal Center, returnees undergo security vetting, including DNA testing to confirm nationality, and receive various types of support to prepare for reintegration, with the aim of reducing risks of recidivism or social exclusion. Community engagement strategies have also been critical, addressing local opposition in areas like Nineveh to foster acceptance of returnees.  

For Syria, adopting this model would require the new government to prioritize reintegration, with substantial donor support to fund re-integration programs, provide economic assistance to returnees and host communities, and implement community engagement to reduce stigma. Such support is essential to ensure a stable reintegration process, encouraging Syrian residents to leave al-Hol voluntarily.