Iraqi-Syrian Relations in the Post-Assad Era: Between Caution and Openness

Written By Sophia Warby

Since Ahmed al-Sharaa assumed the transitional presidency in Syria on January 15, 2025, Iraqi-Syrian relations have witnessed a remarkable transformation. Sharaa, a controversial figure in Iraqi circles due to his experience in the country, seeks to reposition Syria regionally. He aims to open to neighbouring countries, especially Iraq, to reshape their relationship on a more realistic and cooperative basis in light of common challenges. 

Iraqi-Syrian relations have deep historical roots but have been characterized by instability, particularly due to the partisan rivalry between the two branches of the Baath Party over the past decades. With the end of Bashar al-Assad's regime, an opportunity looms to rebuild trust between Baghdad and Damascus, especially given their intersecting security, political, and economic interests. 

Baghdad Summit: An Opportunity to Strengthen Regional Roles

The Arab Summit, scheduled to be held in Baghdad on May 17, 2025, comes at a critical time for Iraq.

This summit is an opportunity for Baghdad to demonstrate its stability and ability to host high-level events. The summit is expected to address several important topics, including the Palestinian issue, crises in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, and Lebanon, and development and Arab integration. Through this summit, Baghdad will seek to present itself as a "rational mediator" in a divided Arab political arena, especially considering that Iraq maintains open relations with most of the conflicting parties.

Ahmed al-Sharaa's Expected Visit: Opportunity or Crisis? 

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has officially invited al-Sharaa to attend the Arab Summit in Baghdad.

Within this context, the potential visit of Syrian Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa to Baghdad to participate in the summit stands out as a sensitive, symbolic and political event. On the one hand, it carries an important diplomatic dimension, while it provokes intense domestic controversies in Iraq. 

A general view shows heads of state and other officials, including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani, on December 20, 2022. (File/AFP)

While some parties view the visit as an opportunity to activate direct dialogue with Damascus, others strongly oppose it due to al-Sharaa's controversial past in Iraq. Qais Khazali, Secretary-General of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, stated, "Sharaa's visit to Baghdad could lead to his arrest, given the existence of an arrest warrant issued against him by Iraqi authorities."

He emphasised that this step could embarrass the government politically and open the door to unforeseen crises, calling for a thorough legal and political review before proceeding with any official opening. While Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani can advocate for certain foreign policy objectives, the diverse political landscape means that Baghdad's foreign policy decisions are influenced by multiple actors. This complexity makes it challenging for Baghdad to be seen as a consistent mediator. The visit of Ahmed al-Sharaa underscores these fundamental challenges, highlighting the internal divisions within Iraq's political framework.

"Sharaa's visit to Baghdad could lead to his arrest, given the existence of an arrest warrant issued against him by Iraqi authorities."

Qais Khazali, Secretary-General of Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq

Additionally, the Islamic Dawa Party, led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, issued a statement urging the government to ensure that all summit participants have a clean judicial record, both locally and internationally. The statement emphasised, "The blood of Iraqis is not cheap, and those who have violated their sanctity or committed documented crimes against them should not be welcomed in Baghdad."

Abu Ali Al-Askari, a spokesperson for the powerful militia Kataib Hezbollah, expressed a similar sentiment, stating, "Arab summits have been held without President Assad, Iraq, or Libya. They certainly won’t stop because the criminal Abu Mohammad al-Golani isn’t attending."

Dozens of Iraqi legislators announced that more than fifty lawmakers would sign a petition demanding the speaker of the Parliament to issue a block on Al-Sharaa entering the country, citing past terrorism allegations and crimes attributed to his faction during Iraq’s internal conflict.

On the other hand, Sunni political factions have rallied in support of al-Sharaa’s inclusion in the summit.

Former MP Dhafir Al-Ani, a prominent Sunni figure, voiced his backing for Baghdad’s efforts to establish ties with the new Syrian authorities.

It is likely that these criticisms made by factions and figures from the Coordination Framework are being voiced by Sudani's political rivals in an attempt to diminish his momentum ahead of the upcoming elections. As a countermeasure to downplay the criticisms from political rivals, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani met with Sayyid Abdullah Nizam, the head of the Shia community in Syria on April 23, 2025. During the meeting, Al-Sudani reaffirmed Iraq’s support for the Syrian people across all their communities and reiterated Baghdad’s commitment to upholding Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity.

Additionally, a high-level Iraqi delegation, led by National Intelligence Service Chief Hamid al-Shatri, arrived in Damascus on April 25, 2025, to hold talks with senior officials. The delegation included representatives from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Trade, and the Border Ports Authority. The discussions aimed to enhance cooperation in counterterrorism, strengthen border security arrangements, and expand economic relations between the two countries. The delegation also explored the possibility of rehabilitating the Iraqi oil pipeline to transport oil through Syrian territory to Mediterranean ports.

The high-level Iraqi delegation, led by National Intelligence Service Chief Hamid al-Shatri, arrives in Damascus.

Amid ongoing political sensitivities surrounding his visit, recent reports indicate that Ahmed al-Sharaa may be seeking U.S. security guarantees, possibly through private security firms, to facilitate his travel to Baghdad. This move reflects both volatility of the current environment and the lack of consensus within Iraq’s political landscape regarding al-Sharaa’s presence. The request signals a lack of trust in the state’s ability to provide adequate protection and risks provoking further backlash from the Shia factions who may view reliance on foreign protection as a violation of sovereignty or a deliberate provocation. More broadly, it underscores the fragmented nature of Iraq’s political and security apparatus, where even high-level diplomatic engagements are mired in controversy, suspicion, and competing agendas. 

Al-Sudani and Sharaa's Meeting in Doha: Preliminary Coordination or Conditional Understandings?

In a notable development ahead of the Arab Summit, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani met with Syrian Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa in the Qatari capital, Doha, on the sidelines of the Doha Forum in April 2025. This meeting is the first of its kind between the two countries' leaderships since the regime change in Syria and comes at a critical time when the regional scene is witnessing a realignment and repositioning. The trilateral meeting, hosted by Qatar’s Emir, focused heavily on developments in Syria and the shared imperative of countering terrorism and stabilizing border regions. Sudani emphasized Iraq’s support and called for a renewed commitment to protecting Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic communities. While diplomatic, the visit reaffirmed Iraq’s continuing concerns about the presence of foreign forces in Syria, and it remains wary of the history of several prominent figures in Syria's new government. 

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia Al-Sudani sits down with Syrian Interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa in Doha, Qatar.

The meeting is a preemptive step paving the way for Sharaa's potential participation in the Baghdad summit and may be an attempt to outline the framework for political understanding and overcome the legal complications related to the arrest warrant issued against him in Iraq. It also demonstrates the Iraqi government's desire to leverage this rapprochement to serve its security and diplomatic interests, without falling into the trap of regional polarisation or internal escalation. 

Kurdish Leaders' Perspectives on Reestablishing Ties with Syria

Kurdish leaders in the Kurdistan region have shown a mixed stance regarding reestablishing ties with Syria.

In January 2025, Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), met with Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in Erbil. This meeting aimed to unify the Kurdish position within Syria and explore ways to separate the SDF from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated a terrorist organization by Turkey.

Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, and Mazloum Abdi, commander of the SDF, in Erbil, January 2025

Barzani emphasized the importance of presenting a united Kurdish front in Syria to negotiate with the new de facto Syrian government from a position of strength. He argued that Kurdish political gains in Iraq, including constitutional recognition, could serve as a model for Syria’s Kurds. However, these efforts for unity come amid persistent threats by Turkey against the SDF, which Ankara views as an extension of the PKK.

The recent deal between the SDF and the new Syrian government to integrate Kurdish-led forces into state institutions has been met with optimism by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). KRG President Nechirvan Barzani expressed support to the agreement in an official statement, viewing it as a potential step towards greater stability and peaceful future for Syria. The KRG continues to emphasize the importance of ensuring that the rights and aspirations of the Kurdish people are respected in any political arrangement.

On April 26, hundreds of Kurdish delegates from Syria, Iraq, and Turkey gathered in Qamishli for the Kurdish Unity and Common Stance Conference, aiming to strengthen Kurdish cooperation and push for a decentralised, democratic Syria. The event, opened by SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, highlighted Kurdish contributions to Syria’s stability and received backing from major Kurdish political figures across the region. The conference proposed engaging with Syria’s interim government to secure Kurdish rights within a decentralized framework, citing the region’s multi-ethnic governance experience. However, tensions have escalated since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, with Kurdish officials accusing President Ahmed al-Sharaa's authorities of marginalizing minorities and undermining Syria's diversity.

“President al-Sharaa warned against any federalist ambitions, framing them as foreign-influenced and contrary to Syria’s Islamic identity”

Despite Kurdish leaders insisting they seek autonomy—not independence—Damascus rejected the conference’s outcomes, condemning decentralization efforts as a threat to Syria’s unity. President al-Sharaa warned against any federalist ambitions, framing them as foreign-influenced and contrary to Syria’s Islamic identity. While the agreement between the SDF and the new Syrian government to integrate Kurdish-led forces into state institutions is set to be implemented by the end of this year, the recent developments associated with the Kurdish demand for decentralisation –which President Al-Sharaa has rejected – may spark tensions and potentially disrupt the process. 

Conclusion: A Window to Rebuild Relations  

Amid this situation, the Iraqi government seeks to maintain a delicate balance between internal pressures and external imperatives. It aims to reposition itself as a neutral and flexible regional actor. This path requires highly sensitive diplomacy that avoids escalation with factions, maintains the independence of external decision-making, and leverages opportunities that may arise from changes in Syria to Iraq's advantage. Ahmed al-Sharaa's potential visit to Baghdad may represent a turning point in Iraqi-Syrian relations. However, it also carries internal and external challenges. Managing this issue requires national dialogue and regional coordination to rebuild relations on realistic foundations that take into account national interests and shared regional security. 

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Sophia Warby
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